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Reforming Financial Regulation—A conference summary 
by Douglas D. Evanoff, vice president and senior financial economist, and William F. Moeller, associate economist
The Chicago Fed’s 45th annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, which took 
place May 6–8, 2009, brought together industry personnel, regulators, and academics 
to discuss the recent financial crisis and financial regulatory reform, among other issues.
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The optimal regulatory  
solution is one that stabilizes 
the financial system without 










































































resulting­in­a­drag­on­economic­activity.­See www.chicagofed.org/BankStructureConference for  
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Beyond Basel: Banking, Securities, and Insurance,­
Hal­S.­Scott­(ed.),­Oxford,­UK:­Oxford­
University­Press,­chapter­5;­see­also­the­Squam­
Lake­Working­Group­on­Financial­Regulation,­
www.squamlakeworkinggroup.org.­
3­Anil­K­Kashyap,­Raghuram­G.­Rajan,­and­
Jeremy­C.­Stein,­2008,­“Rethinking­capital­
regulation,”­paper­at­Federal­Reserve­Bank­
of­Kansas­City­Economic­Symposium,­Main-
taining­Stability­in­a­Changing­Financial­
System,­Jackson­Hole,­WY,­August­21–23,­
available­at­www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/­
2008/KashyapRajanStein.08.08.08.pdf.
size­because­it­had­been­the­large­firms­
that­had­pushed­a­bad­situation­into­a­
major­crisis.­He­argued­large­firms­were­
able­to­hold­less­capital,­most­likely­be-
cause­the­market­assumed­they­would­be­
bailed­out­in­a­crisis.­This­assumption­
was­probably­appropriate,­since­his­data­
showed­a­positive­linear­relationship­be-
tween­firm­size­and­the­size­of­the­fed-
eral­government’s­capital­injections.
Finally,­Haldane­noted­that,­while­the­
payments­and­settlement­systems­func-
tioned­well­during­the­crisis,­some­over-
the-counter­(OTC)­markets­did­not.­
These­markets­became­too­complex­and­
interconnected­to­effectively­price­coun-
terparty­risk.­To­avoid­similar­problems­
in­the­future,­he­advocated­the­use­of­
clearinghouses­in­OTC­markets,­such­as­
the­credit­default­swap­market.
Reinhart­concentrated­on­problems­asso-
ciated­with­government­intervention.­In-
terventions­can­distort­private­incentives­
so­that­management­and­counterparties­
are­less­disciplined,­increasing­risk­to­the­
financial­system.­In­addition,­inconsistent­
government­intervention­policies­can­
create­uncertainty.­As­a­result,­private­cap-
ital­could­exit­the­system,­and­the­gov-
ernment­would­be­left­to­fill­the­void.­
Government­intervention­created­the­
TSTF­problem,­Reinhart­contended.­The­
more­complex­and­interconnected­an­
institution­is,­the­greater­the­effect­its­
failure­would­have­on­the­system.­The­
probability­that­the­government­will­bail­
out­an­institution­increases­with­its­level­
of­complexity.­Accordingly,­counterpar-
ties­will­price­in­the­probability­of­govern-
ment­intervention,­providing­complex­
firms­with­a­funding­advantage.­­He­noted­
that­this­government-induced­distortion­
gives­firms­incentives­to­become­more­
complex.­Ironically,­the­greater­complexity­
makes­the­firm­more­difficult­to­manage,­
increasing­risk­to­the­firm.­Overall,­this­
makes­the­financial­system­more­vulner-
able­to­crises­and­increases­the­need­for­
government­intervention.
Reinhart­argued­that­another­layer­of­su-
pervision­is­not­necessary,­nor­is­there­a­
need­for­a­special­resolution­authority.­
Instead,­he­proposed­a­“modular­solu-
tion,”­where­a­financial­holding­company­
is­composed­of­parts­that­can­be­discon-
nected­and­reassembled.­In­the­event­of­
a­crisis,­systemically­important­parts­can­
be­protected­in­bankruptcy.­The­mod-
ules­that­are­not­systemically­important­
can­be­left­to­the­market.­This­proposal­
involves­reducing­the­number­of­corpo-
rate­charters­and­agencies,­consolidating­
balance­sheets,­and­giving­up­efficiencies­
related­to­scale­and­scope.­Reinhart­ar-
gued­that­these­changes­would­facilitate­
international­cooperation,­make­pre-
packaged­bankruptcy­a­viable­option,­
and­improve­economic­efficiency.­
Conclusion
The­2009­conference­facilitated­impor-
tant­discussions­about­financial­regulatory­
reform­and­lessons­learned­from­the­re-
cent­crisis.­Reflecting­on­the­crisis,­Federal­
Reserve­Chairman­Ben­S.­Bernanke­
stated­in­his­keynote­address:­“It­is­imper-
ative­that­we­apply­the­lessons­of­this­ex-
perience­to­strengthen­our­regulatory­
system,­both­at­the­level­of­its­overall­ar-
chitecture­and­in­its­daily­execution.”­In­
considering­regulatory­reform,­we­must­
understand­how­the­crisis­developed,­what­
aggravated­the­situation,­and­how­well­the­
political­and­regulatory­systems­functioned.­
Also,­we­must­consider­the­ramifications­
that­reform­will­have­on­the­financial­sys-
tem­and­on­the­real­economy.­The­opti-
mal­solution­is­one­that­stabilizes­the­
financial­system­without­hindering­its­abil-
ity­to­operate­efficiently.­Efforts­are­under­
way­to­create­that­optimal­framework.­
Progress­toward­that­goal­will­be­discussed­
at­the­46th­annual­Conference­on­Bank­
Structure­and­Competition,­to­be­held­
May­5–7,­2010.